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Michaela Estelle Okninski* A Comparative Analysis of
Voluntariness Safeguards and
Review Procedure under Oregon
and Netherlands' Physician
Assisted Dying Laws
This article provides a comparative statutory analysis of the requirements for a
voluntary decision in a request for physician assisted dying under Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act and the Netherlands' Termination of Life on Request and Assisted
Suicide (Review Procedures) Act. This comparative analysis aims to provide
insight into how voluntariness is determined in practice and how the review
procedure is conducted, with a view to identifying strengths and limitations within
a legislative framework. First, the legislative safeguards aimed at protecting a
voluntary decision are discussed. This is followed by an examination of the review
procedure. This article concludes by arguing that there are concerning limitations
with both the statutory safeguards and review procedure under Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act.
Cet article presente une analyse legislative comparative des exigences en
matiere de decision volontaire lors d'une demande d'aide medicale a mourir en
vertu de la Death with Dignity Act de /Oregon et de la Termination of Life on
Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act des Pays-Bas. Cette
analyse comparative vise a donner un apergu de la maniere dont le caractere
volontaire de la decision est determine dans la pratique et de la maniere dont la
procedure dexamen est menee, en vue d'identifier les forces et les faiblesses
du cadre legislatif. Tout d'abord, les garanties legislatives visant a proteger
le caractere volontaire d'une decision sont discutees. Suit une analyse de la
procedure dexamen. L'article conclut en faisant valoir qu'il existe des limites a
la fois aux garanties legislatives et a la procedure dexamen en vertu de la Death
with Dignity Act de /Oregon.
* PhD Candidate, The University of Adelaide, South Australia. The author would like to thank
Associate Professor Bernadette Richards and Dr Beth Nosworthy for their support in writing this
article.
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Euthanasia and physician assisted ying are controversial practices and
remain illegal throughout most of the world. However, a select handful
of jurisdictions have now actively legislated to permit these practices if
certain criteria are met.1
1. See for example the Oregon Death with DignityAct, ORS, 127.800-.897 (2015); The Washington
Death with Dignity Act, RCW 70.245 (2008); An Act Relating to Patient Choice and Control at
End of Life, VSA 18, Ch 113 §§ 5281-5292 (2013); California s End of Life Option Act, HSC, Pt
1.85 §§ 443-443.22, (2015). Since writing this article, the End of Life Option Act has been declared
void as unconstitutional see Ahn v Hestrin (Cal Superior CrtlCounty of Riverside, RIC 1607135,
26 August 2016); Ahn v Hestrin (Cal Superior Crt/County of Riverside, RIC 1607135, 25 August
2018). Therefore, physicians cannot issue lethal prescriptions under the law. The Attorney-General
of California has filed a motion to vacate to be heard on 29 June 2018 see Death With Dignity,
California: Current Status, online: <https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/california/>; The District
Of Columbia Death with Dignity Act (2017); Colorado End of Life Options Act, C.R.S., 25-48-101
(2017); Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, 2002 (Nth);
The Belgian Act on Euthanasia, May 28, 2002; Law of March 16, 2009 on Euthanasia nd Assisted
Suicide (Lux); An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendm ents to Other Acts
(medical assistance in dying), SC 2016, c 3. Since writing this article, two jurisdictions - the State of
Victoria, Australia and the State of Hawaii, USA- have passed assisted dying legislation In Victoria,
the legislature passed the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic), which is set to come into force
on 19 June 2019. Voluntary Assisted Dying permits eligible persons to make a request for voluntary
assisted dying, subject to certain legislative safeguards see Voluntary Assisted Dying Act (2017); see
also Caley Otter, 'Voluntary Assisted Dying Bill 2019' (Research Note No 1, Parliamentary Library
& Information Services, Legislative Assembly, 2017). In Hawaii, the Our Care, Our Choice Act
was signed into law on 5 April 2018. The Our Care, Our Choice Act establishes a framework for
terminally ill persons to request a lethal prescription from their physician to end their life, subject to
statutory safeguards. The Act is set to come into force on 1 January 2019 see Our Care, Our Choice
Act 2018, House Bill 2739; see also Death with Dignity, Hawaii: Current Status, online: <https://
www.deathwithdignity.org/states/hawaii/>.
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On 27 October 1997, Oregon legalised physician assisted dying
(PAD) by enacting the Death With Dignity Act (DWDA).2 On 1 April
2002, the Netherlands followed by inserting defences into the Criminal
Code to permit euthanasia nd physician assisted ying (E/PAD) in certain
circumstances by enacting the Termination ofLife on Request andAssisted
Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2002 (Review Procedures Act).3 Thus,
these statutes rendered Oregon and the Netherlands the first jurisdictions
world-wide to lawfully permit some form of assisted dying.4
It is important to note that there is no right to request an assisted
death in either Oregon or the Netherlands. Rather, the statutes establish a
regulatory framework for physicians to follow if confronted with a request
for assisted dying.5 Failure to comply with the legislative criteria can
result in criminal prosecution in the Netherlands. The position concerning
criminal prosecution is not as clear in Oregon, however, failure to comply
with the legislative requirements can result in professional disciplinary
action.'
Strict requirements must be satisfied before a person can receive
assistance to die. Voluntariness and the absence of external pressure, or a
similar behaviour that operates to undermine voluntariness, form part of
2. See ORS, 127.800-.897 (2015), ibid, hereafter referred to as the DWDA. The DWDA prohibits
euthanasia and only authorises a physician to prescribe lethal medication for the person to self-
administer. Additionally, the term physician assisted dying, as opposed to physician assisted suicide,
is preferred here as actions taken under the DWDA are not deemed to be suicide. See the DWDA, §
3.14.
3. See, Termination ofLife on Request andAssisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, 2002 (Nth).
The Netherlands have adopted a broader approach to assisted dying and permit both acts of euthanasia
and physician assisted dying. Thus, in the Netherlands, the physician can either actively administer
a lethal injection to eligible patients (euthanasia) or provide them with medication to self-administer
(PAD).
4. The Northern Territory, Australia, was the first jurisdiction globally to legalize euthanasia and
physician assisted suicide by enacting The Rights of the Terminally IllAct, 1995 (NT). However, the
legislation was subsequently invalidated by the Federal Government enacting the Euthanasia Laws
Act, 1997 (Cth), which curtailed the scope of the Territories legislative power on euthanasia and
physician assisted suicide.
5. However, in the Netherlands, concerns have been raised over the ostensible increase in reported
cases of E/PAD over the past few years. Theo Boer poignantly criticises the Dutch model arguing
that 'Euthanasia is fast becoming the preferred, if not the only acceptable, mode of dying for cancer
patients. Whereas the law treats assisted dying as an exception, public opinion is shifting towards
interpreting it as a right' see Theo Boer, "Why Dutch and Belgian Experiences on Assisted Dying
Should Concern Other Countries" (2016) 131 Zadok Perspectives at 5-6.
6. ORS § 4.01(1). It is important to highlight at the outset of this discussion that there have been
no adverse findings against physicians for failing to properly consider voluntariness or to assess for
external pressure in a request for EPAD. In Oregon under the DWDA there have been cases where
provisions aimed at safeguarding voluntariness were contravened and these cases were sent to the
Oregon Medical Board for determination. However, in all referred cases, the Oregon Medical Board
did not sanction physicians for non-compliance with the law. For further discussion see pages 34-36
and Part III.
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the key safeguards and are fundamental elements of a valid request in both
Oregon and the Netherlands.
This article will critically examine the safeguards aimed at protecting
the voluntariness of decisions and the review procedure under Oregon's
DWDA and the Netherlands Review Procedure Act. The purpose for
limiting this critical analysis to Oregon and the Netherlands is that together
they have accumulated a vast amount of empirical evidence and scholarly
discussion when compared to other jurisdictions with similar laws.
Additionally, providing a comparative analysis of two distinctly different
approaches to regulating assisted ying will provide key insight into any
strengths and limitations inherent in a particular model to protecting the
voluntariness of decisions.
Critical examination of Oregon and the Netherland's assisted dying
laws has generated ample discussion and research in the existing scholarly
literature. For instance, Hendin and Foley, who have written extensively
on Oregon's model of physician assisted ying, argue that the legislative
safeguards in Oregon's Death with Dignity Act are frequently being
circumvented. Additionally, speaking of the role of the Oregon Health
Authority, they argue that the review procedure fails to collect important
information and so fails to effectively monitor the law.' On a similar note,
Miller and Kim undertook a detailed review of reported cases of euthanasia
and physician assisted suicide between 2012 and 2015 in the Netherlands
where the due care criteria had not been met.8 They concluded that during
this period, 32 cases failed to meet the due care criteria with the majority
(22) failing to adhere to procedural or technical criteria, while the remainder
concerned the substantive aspects of the law including voluntariness.9
Miller and Kim argued that in the cases where the substantive criteria
were not met, the oversight committee was not concerned with "whether
the physician made the correct judgment, but whether the physician
followed a thorough process."" Similarly, Lewis and Black conducted a
comprehensive investigation on the adherence to the legislative criteria
in the Netherlands and Oregon, concluding that, amongst other things,
"the legal criteria that apply to an individual's request for assisted dying
7. Herbert Hendin & Kathleen Foley, "Physician Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Medical
Perspective" (2008) 106 Mich L Rev 1613 at 1613; see also, Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin,
'The Oregon Report: Don't Ask, Don't Tell' (1999) Hastings Centre Report 37.
8. David Gibbes Miller & Scott Kim, "Euthanasia and Physician-assisted suicide not meeting due
care criteria in the Netherlands: A Qualitative Review of Review Committee Judgments" (2017) 7:10
BMJ Open 1.
9. Ibid at 3-8.
10. Ibid at 9 (emphasis in original).
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are well respected."11 While voluntariness was considered in each of
these articles, the discussion was necessarily brief, and voluntariness as
a safeguard was not subject to comprehensive evaluation. Therefore, the
sole focus of this article is the requirement hat a request for assisted dying
was voluntarily made, or in other words a true representation of a freely
made decision. There is a paucity of comprehensive research, providing
comparative analysis of the law in Oregon and the Netherlands concerning
this, with a view to identify any strengths or limitations within a particular
model. This article aims to remedy this gap in the literature.
This article will be divided into three parts. Part I will provide a
descriptive overview of the statutory requirements for a valid request
for PAD in Oregon and E/PAD in the Netherlands. Here an overview of
legislative criteria and safeguards will be provided. However, this part
will primarily focus on provisions that aim to protect the voluntariness
of decisions and safeguard against external pressure. Where appropriate,
evidence released by the respective oversight authorities will be considered.
Part II will provide a descriptive examination of the review procedure
and role of the oversight authorities who are responsible for determining
compliance with the legislative criteria. Finally, Part III of this article will
provide a critical comparative analysis of the voluntary safeguards and
review procedure in Oregon and the Netherlands. It is at this stage where
the strengths and limitations within each particular model will be drawn
out and discussed. It is hoped that this comparative statutory analysis will
provide key insight into an integral aspect of assisted dying regulation and
prove useful for jurisdictions still considering legalisation.
I. The Legislative Safeguards
Under Oregon's DWDA and the Netherland's Review Procedures Act,
there are considerable steps to satisfy before a person can be deemed
eligible for assistance. The process established under the DWDA is quite
methodical in comparison to the requirements of the Review Procedures
Act. Moreover, as will be discussed, the criteria to access PAD or E/PAD
differs considerably between the two jurisdictions. The key requirements
under the DWDA and the Review Procedures Act will be discussed. For
ease of reference the integral differences have been tabulated. Table 1
11. Penney Lewis & Ism Black, "Adherence to the Request Criterion in Jurisdictions Where Assisted
Dying is Lawful? A Review of the Criteria and Evidence in the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon and
Switzerland" (2013) 41:4 Human Rights and Disability 885-892; see also Penney Lewis & Ism Black,
"Reporting and Scrutiny of Reported Cases in Four Jurisdictions where Assisted Dying is Lawful: A
Review of the Evidence in the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon and Switzerland" (2013) 13:4 Medical
Law International 221.
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provides an overview of the key differences concerning the legislative
criteria, whilst Table 2 provides a comparative overview of the key
safeguards that aim to protect a voluntary decision.
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1. Oregon
Oregon was one of the first jurisdictions globally to legalise PAD by
enacting the DWDA in 1994.12 However, the legalisation of PAD was not
accepted uncritically, and legal challenges which sought to invalidate the
DWDA ultimately delayed its operation until October 27, 1997.13 The
DWDA has now been operational for over twenty years.
Eligibility Criteria and Safeguards
To be eligible to make a request for PAD under the DWDA several key
eligibility criteria the must be met. First, the person must be resident in
Oregon.14 Second, the person must be over 18 years old and diagnosed
with a terminal disease that will produce death within six months.15 Finally,
only persons who have voluntarily expressed their wish to die may make
a request.16
The DWDA includes the requirement hat the patient is making an
informed decision, making the request voluntarily and is capable.1 7 The
terms "capable" and "informed decision" are both defined under the
statute. However, neither "voluntarily" nor "voluntary" are defined under
the law (see Table 2).
Ensuring that the patient is making an informed decision is critical to
the process and must be medically confirmed. Here the attending physician
must inform the patient of their medical diagnosis and prognosis, the
risks and probable result of taking the medication and alternatives such
as hospice care, comfort care and pain control.1 9 As a precaution against
misdiagnosis or error, these requirements must be medically confirmed
by a second physician.2" Additionally, if either physician suspects that the
patient has impaired judgment or that they are suffering from pathological
depression, then the patient must be referred for counseling.21 This is
an important step in the process, as persons deemed to have impaired
12. However, see above n 4, for discussion on the Rights of the Terminally IllAct, 1995 (NT).
13. For discussion onthe legal challenges see generally Guenter Lewy, Assisted Death in Europe and
America: Four Regimes and Their Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Giza Lopes,
Dying with Dignity: A Legal Approach to Assisted Death, (Santa Barbara, California: PRAEGAR,
2015); Oregon Health Authority, History (February, 2013), online: Oregon Health Authority <http:/
www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/
DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>.
14. ORS, 127.805 § 2.01, supra note 2.
15. Ibid; and see, ORS 127.800 s 1.01(12).
16. Ibid. See Table 1 for an overview of the criteria.
17. Ibid, § 3.01(a).
18. See ibid, s 1.01. Voluntariness will be discussed in greater detail below.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid, 127.820.
21. Ibid, 127.825 § 3.03.
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judgment or depression can be precluded from accessing lethal medication
under the DWDA.22
Additional requirements under the DWDA are that the patient must
make repeated requests to he same attending physician. The patient must
make two oral requests at least 15 days apart, as well as a written request,3
signed in the presence of two witnesses.24 Importantly, at the time of
making the second oral request, the opportunity to rescind the request
must be provided and recorded on the patient's medical record.25 Finally,
48 hours must lapse between the patient's request being authorised and the
medication being dispensed.26
Voluntariness and Absence of External Pressure
In the DWDA, the word "voluntarily" can be found throughout the statute.
For example, the person must have "made the request voluntarily,"27 must
be "acting voluntarily,"2 8 and must have "voluntarily expressed [a] wish
to die."29 It is mandated that voluntariness be assessed by two physicians.
However, what "acting voluntarily" involves is not defined. Thus, the
brevity of discussion on PAD under the DWDA makes it difficult to
critically examine the law.
When the DWDA came into force, The Center for Ethics in Health
Care at the Oregon Health & Science University published a guidebook
to provide expert multi-disciplinary insight into how to comply with
the legal requirements.3" However, while the guidebook is detailed, the
discussion on the "voluntary" requirements under the DWDA is again
limited. The guidebook suggests that both the attending and consulting
physician should be aware of the "broader circumstances and a sensitivity
to any indication that the patient's request is coerced or the product of the
undue influence of friends, family, or others."31 Moreover, the guidebook
22. However, it is important to highlight that persons uffering from a form of depression are not
definitively precluded from accessing PAD. The decisive factor in these cases will rest upon the
severity the illness and the effect it has on their judgment, thus ensuring that persons are not unfairly
excluded from accessing PAD because of the mere presence of depression.
23. Ibid, 127.840 §§ 3.06, 3.08.
24. Ibid, 127.810 § 2.02.
25. Ibid, 127.845 § 3.07.
26. Ibid, 127.850 § 3.08.
27. Ibid, 127.815 § 3.01(1)(a).
28. Ibid, 127.810 § 2.02(2).
29. Ibid, 127.805 § 2.01(1).
30. PatrickDumetal, The Oregon Death with DignityAct:A GuidebookJorHealthcare Professionals




130 The Dalhousie Law Journal
suggests that requests for PAD should not be authorized where there are
any remaining doubts concerning volition.32
Additionally, two independent witnesses must attest on the written
request for PAD that the patient is acting voluntarily.3 3 The witnesses
need not be personally known to the person making the request for PAD,
however some exclusionary criteria apply. For instance, one witness
cannot be a relative of the person by either blood, marriage or adoption;34
a beneficiary entitled to a portion of the estate;35 or an owner/operator or
employee of a "health care facility where the qualified person is receiving
medical treatment."36
As an added safeguard, the witnesses must also declare that the
person making the request was not influenced by certain behaviours that
operate to undermine voluntariness. They are required to attest that the
person was not coerced to sign the request nor acting under duress or
undue influence.3" This tripartite test is a peculiar feature of the DWDA,
as these requirements go beyond assessing for mere external pressure by
considering three distinct forms of behaviour3-coercion, duress and
undue influence.
This strict approach reflects the position that external pressures are
nuanced and operate at varying degrees, ranging from the subtle (undue
influence), through to the extreme (coercion/duress), all of which are
unacceptable under the DWDA. This tripartite test appears to be intended
to operate more rigorously than a catch all term such as "external
pressure." However, again the key terms here-duress, coercion and
undue influence-are not defined under the DWDA.
Having a seemingly strong stance on safeguarding voluntariness is
indeed justified in the circumstances and is not challenged here. Witnesses,
especially if they are personally known to the person making a request, are
likely in a better position to assess for varying kinds of external pressure that
a physician and arguably provides additional assurance of voluntariness.
However, it remains to be seen what utility such a strong stance has on
safeguarding against unlawful external pressures if the majority of persons
called upon to attest to the non-existence of these behaviours are unlikely
32. Ibid.
33. ORS, 127.815 § 3.01(1)(a).
34. Ibid, 127.810 § 2.02(2)(a).
35. Ibid, § 2.02(2)(b).
36. Ibid, § 2.02(2)(c).
37. Ibid.
38. It is important to state that under the DWDA the term 'external pressure' is not used to in the
statute. However, external pressure is used as an umbrella term to refer to the many forms ofbehaviour
that are included in the DWDA.
Voluntariness Safeguards and Review Procedure under 131
Oregon and the Netherlands' Physician Assisted Dying Laws
to know what they are assessing for. Surely, witnesses would benefit from
additional guidance here. The inclusion of coercion, duress and undue
influence as safeguards will be critiqued in Part III.
2. The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, euthanasia and assisted suicide remain criminal
offences under Articles 293 and 294 of the Criminal Code.3 9 However,
a physician can lawfully perform euthanasia or assisted suicide if they
adhere to the six due care criteria stipulated in Review Procedures Act
2002 which came into force on 1 April 2002.41
Due Care Criteria and Safeguards
To be eligible for E/PAD under the Review Procedures Act, the physician
must:
4'
a. be satisfied that the patients request is voluntary and well
considered; [emphasis added]
b. be satisfied that the patient's suffering is unbearable, with no
prospect of improvement;
c. have informed the patient about his situation and prognosis;
d. have come to the conclusion, together with the patient, that there
is no reasonable alternative in the patient's situation;
e. have consulted at least one other, independent physician, who
must see the patient and give a written opinion on whether the
due care criteria set out in (a) to (d) have been fulfilled;
39. Wetboek van strafrecht, current consolidated text of 10 March 1984 in Staatsblad 1984 no 92.
English translation, as of'7 Oct 1996 in Staatsblad 1996 no 505. The Dutch penal code. Translated by
L. Rayar & S. Wadswarth [et al], Littleton, Colo, FB Rothman, 1997.
40. Prior to the enactment of the Review Procedures Act, the courts had recognised that doctors
could raise the defence of necessity if they assisted a person to die either through administering
euthanasia or assisted suicide subject to certain conditions. Thus, the courts played a seminal role in
shaping the parameters of lawful euthanasia and these rules have largely been retained in the Review
Procedures Act. However, critical examination of the seminal cases and the review procedure prior
to the enactment of the Review Procedures Act is beyond the scope of this article. For Discussion see
Guenter Lewy, Assisted Death in Europe andAmerica: Four Regimes and Their Lessons (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 18-68.
41. Termination ofLife on Request andAssisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, 2002 (Nth) s 2(1)
(a)-(f). Prior to the enactment of the Review Procedures Act, operational 1 April 2002, the Regional
Euthanasia Review Committees Order established the procedure for reviewing cases of euthanasia
and assisted-suicide. Under the Review Procedures Act, the procedure was amended. However, this
discussion is beyond the scope of this article see Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual
Report 2002 at 4-5, online: <english.euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/publications/
annual-reports/2002/annual-reports/annual-reports>.
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f have exercised due medical care and attention in terminating the
patient's life or assisting in his suicide [own emphasis] .42
The first due-care criterion (s 1(a)), requires that the physician must be
"satisfied that the patient's request is voluntary and well-considered."43
The voluntary nature of the request must also be considered by a second
independent physician.44 However, the physician who performs E/PAD-
the attending physician-not the independent physician, bears the burden
of demonstrating that they properly assessed the voluntary nature of the
request. It is the attending physician who will be criminally liable under
the Review Procedures Act.45 It is also important to highlight that the
second independent physician does not have to agree with the primary
physician's findings and E/PAD can be performed despite any professional
disagreement.6 The referral itself is likely to satisfy the due care criteria.
For example, consider a hypothetical clinical situation where a patient
requests euthanasia from their primary physician. The primary physician
has been the patient's physician for years and determines that the request
was voluntary, well considered and the patient's suffering was unbearable
with no prospect of improvement; they had informed the patient of their
prognosis and possible treatment options and both came to the conclusion
together the euthanasia was the best option. However, to lawfully perform
euthanasia, the primary physician must consult a second independent
physician. In examining the patient, the second physician raises doubts
about the volition of the request and has concerns about external pressure
exerted on the patient by a close relative. However, the primary physician
had no such concerns about volition and administers euthanasia. Under
the Review Procedures Act, there is no requirement for consensus amongst
42. Review Procedures Act, ibid, s 2(1)(a). It is necessary to note that prior to the enactment of
the Review Procedures Act in 2002, euthanasia and assisted suicide could be performed in limited
circumstances by a medical practitioner ifthey demonstrated that they acted out of necessity. However,
because this thesis is focused on statutory models ofE/PAD, reference to the judicial decisions prior to
the enactment of the Review ProceduresAct will be limited and considered when necessary. However,
it is important to note that these decisions informed the principles in the Review Procedures Act and
therefore, is still applicable.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid, s 2(1)(e).
45. Discussion on the multi-disciplinary composition of the Review Committees established under
the Review Procedures Act will be addressed later.
46. In the Netherlands, there are specially trained consultant physicians, called Support and
Consultation for Euthanasia in the Netherlands (SCEN) physicians, who provide independent advice
to attending physicians in cases of euthanasia. For discussion on the qualifications and training
requirements for SCEN physicians in the Netherlands see Yanna Van Wesemael et al, "Establishing
Specialized Health Services for Professional Consultation in Euthanasia: Experiences in the
Netherlands and Belgium" (2009) 9:220 BMC Health Services Research, online: <bmchealthservres.
biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1472-6963-9-220?site-bmchealthservres.biomedcentral.com>.
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the physicians. The act of referral alone would mean that the primary
physician is likely to have acted with due care, thus satisfying the elements
of the statutory defence. However, if such a case did arise, and the facts
of this hypothetical scenario are not so fanciful as to render this scenario
improbable, it would be prudent for the primary physician to seek another
expert opinion. The lack of consensus hould not be overlooked and greater
caution in such cases would lead to greater protection for the physician,
and importantly, the patient. However, consensus is not mandatory under
the law.
Turning back now to the interpretation of a voluntary decision, it is
important to highlight that the first due care criterion requires that the request
be "voluntary and well considered."4 At law this has been interpreted as
a two-limb test each of which requires consideration of distinct facts. This
discussion will only focus on the first limb-the voluntary criterion-as
"well considered" lies beyond the narrow focus of this discussion.
'Voluntary' is not defined in the text of the Review Procedures Act.4"
However, there is considerable discussion on the parameters of this
criterion by the Regional Euthanasia Review Committees (Regionale
Toetsingscommissies Euthanasie) (Committees).49 The Committees' have
defined voluntary as consisting of two separate elements, stating that:
There are two aspects to this [voluntary]. The request must be internally
voluntary, i.e. the patient must have the mental capacity to determine his
own wishes freely, and externally voluntary, i.e. he must not have made
his request under pressure or unacceptable influence from those around
him.50
Thus, it can be seen that this criterion itself requires consideration of
complex factors which are not explicitly evident on the face of the law.
However, this article is concerned with external voluntariness, not internal
47. Review Procedures Act, supra note 38, s 2(1)(a).
48. Ibid.
49. The role of the regional review committee will be discussed in Part 11 of this article. As the
committees play an integral role in interpreting and applying the due care criteria, it is not possible to
isolate them from this discussion in Part I. This can be distinguished from the procedure in Oregon, as
the Oregon Health Authority do not have such a strong role or influence in interpreting the law. This
point of difference will be considered in Part III of this article.
50. Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2010 (2011) at 11, online: <www.
euthanasiecommissie.nl/uitspraken/j aarverslagen/20 10/nl-en-du-fr/nl-en-du-fr/jaarverslag-20 10>.
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voluntariness,51 therefore this discussion will be narrowed further and
will only consider the external voluntariness element of the "voluntary"
criterion.
External Voluntariness
External voluntariness looks beyond the individual's decision-making
competence and instead focuses on their social environment for
unacceptable external pressure placed on them to request E/PAD. When
considering external voluntariness, the physician must demonstrate
how they determined that the person making the request was not "under
pressure or unacceptable influence from those around him [or her]."" This
must be explicitly documented in the report sent to the Committees. To
ensure transparency and clarity with the due care criteria under the Review
Procedures Act, the Committees perennially make information on their
judgments publicly available.
The Committees can, at their discretion, publish individual case
reports on their website. This discretion is usually exercised when a
case raises novel issues with the interpretation of the due care criteria
or where it has been determined that a physician did not terminate life
in accordance with the due care criteria. It is important to note that
there currently exists a scarcity of discussion of cases in English where
external voluntariness is considered in detail. Until recently, most of the
individual case reports were only available in Dutch. The Committees
have, however, started to reproduce these reports in English, presumably
to provide greater transparency into how the substantive legal criteria are
interpreted. Currently, judgments from 13 individual case reports (2014-
2016) have been published in English,53 yet external voluntariness has not
been an issue in any of these cases. However, in these judgments, it is
evident that that the families were included in the discussions on E/PAD in
most cases.4 Thus, the involvement of the family in the decision-making
process appears to be important. This supports the relational approach
51. Internal voluntariness focuses on the competence of the person requesting euthanasia. Critical
to this element is the requirement for the patient to be decisionally competent. Decisional competence
refers to the requirement 'that the patient is able to understand relevant information about his [sic]
situation and prognosis, consider any alternatives and assess the implications of his [sic] decision'
For discussion on the elements of internal voluntariness see Regional Euthanasia Review Committee,
Code of Practice (April 2015), online: <www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/de-toetsingscommissies/
uitspraken/brochures/brochures/code-of-practice/ i/code-of-practice>.
52. See Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, supra note 50.
53. See Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, Judgments: Voluntary and Well-Considered
Request, (2016), online: <english.euthanasiecommissie.nl/judgments/d/d-voluntary - nd-well-
considered-request/documents>.
54. See ibid.
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to decision making.5 However, important questions remain. When does
acceptable familial involvement transform into unacceptable external
pressure and thus vitiate external voluntariness? When does the invisible
line get crossed? In an attempt to answer this, individual case reports,
along with the Annual Reports and other authoritative material released
by the Committees will be used to provide a foundation of what external
voluntariness means under the Review Procedures Act.
However, it must be acknowledged that this discussion may not
be a complete representation of the information available on external
voluntariness under the Review Procedures Act. It is likely that there
is more diverse, in depth information in Dutch. However, as access to
information beyond the English translations of the Annual Reports was not
possible, this discussion is limited in its scope.
A logical starting point for this discussion is the existence of a
physician-patient relationship. Although not prescriptive in the legislation,
it was initially considered that for E/PAD to be administered with due care
it must "presuppose some kind of clinical relationship with the patient."56
This used to be considered essential to determine the external voluntariness
of a request.5 Doctor/patient relationships that were solely confined to
the performance of euthanasia were likely to fail to meet this due care
criterion because it was assumed that external voluntariness could not be
properly assessed under these circumstances.8
However, in recent years this principle has been eroded with the
emergence of SLK End-of-Life-Clinics in 2012, whose sole responsibility
55. Familial involvement and support is viewed as an important factor influencing assessment of
the due care criteria and it has been argued that the erosion of the long-standing physician/patient
relationship has placed greater emphasis on familial input in decision making for E/PAD, see Marianne
Snijdewind, Dick Willems et al, "A Study of the First Year of the End-of-Life Clinic for Physician-
Assisted Dying in the Netherlands" (2015) 175:10 JAMA Intern Med 1633 at 1639.
56. Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2002, (2003) at 16, online: <www.
euthanasiecommissie.nluitspraken/j aarverslagen2002/nlendufr/nlendufr/jaarverslag-2002>; Theo
Boer, "Following the Guide? Why Dutch and Belgian Experiences on Assisted Dying Should Concern
Other Countries" (2016) 131 Zadok Perspectives 5; For more discussion on the watering down of this
provision see Theo Boer, "Dialectics of Lead; 50 Years of Dutch Euthanasia and its Lessons" (2018)
75:2 Intl J Envtl Stud 239 at 243-244.
57. Ibid at 16-18. In 2002 a doctor who euthanised a patient after being in a clinical relationship
with them for only one day did not act with the due care and the case was referred to the Board of
Procurators-General. Pertinent to the Committees' referral was, amongst other things, the brevity of
the physician/patient relationship.
58. Ibidat 16.
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is confined to the provision of E/PAD.59 SLK physicians consult patients
on an average of three visits prior to approving/administering E/PAD,
thus departing from the previous model relationship.6" This was initially
recognised as a point for concern by the Committees when reviewing
cases and consequently, all notifications received from SLK were listed
as non-straightforward, and therefore required mandatory discussion at
the monthly Committee meetings.61 However, in 2015, the Committees
indicated that they now apply the same procedure, as in other cases, for
notifications received from SLK, thus meaning that notifications are not,
as a matter of policy, automatically considered non-straightforward.62
The Committee Secretary can now use their discretion regarding how to
categorise notifications received from SLK.
It might be said that this rule is still flexible as there is no rigid
requirement concerning the duration of a physician-patient relationship.
The important factor is that the physician must know the patient long
enough to carefully examine the voluntary nature of the request.
A case reported in 200363 provides insight into external voluntariness
as it considers an important threshold question for external pressure. In
this case, the physician identified that there was some external pressure
on the person to request E/PAD from relatives. However, they concluded
that the pressure was not strong enough to vitiate external voluntariness.
Although this example does not provide comprehensive insight into the
technical/nuanced elements of external voluntariness, it does suggest hat
some pressure can permissibly be exerted on persons to request E/PAD.
59. See, for example, Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2012 (2013)
at 13, online: <english.euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/publications/annual-
reports/2002/annual-reports/annual-reports>. For discussion on SLK's operating procedures see
Marianne Snijdewind et al, "A Study of the First Year of the End-of-Life Clinic for Physician-Assisted
Dying in the Netherlands" (2015) 175:10 JAMA Intern Med 1633 at 1634.
60. Theo Boer, "Following the Guide? Why Dutch and Belgian Experiences on Assisted Dying
Should Concern Other Countries" (2016) 131 Zadok Perspectives 5 at 6.
61. Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2013 (2014) at 9, online: <english.
euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/pub licatio ns/annual-reports/2 0 02/annual -
reports/annual-reports>. For discussion on straightforward and non-straightforward cases see
Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2011 (2012) at 5-7, online: <english.
euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/publications/annual-reports/2002/annual-reports/
annual-reports>.
62. Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2015 (2016) at 13, online: <english.
euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/publications/annual-reports/2002/annual-reports/
annual-reports>.
63. Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2003 (2004) at 12-14, online: <https:/
english.euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/publications/annual-reports/2002/annual-
reports/annual-reports>.
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Turning to the broader information available, the Code of Practice (the
Code) published by the Committees, provides basic information regarding
the parameters of external voluntariness.64 The Code seeks to provide
information on behaviour that may indicate external voluntariness is being
undermined. For example, the Code states that a "request must have been
made without any undue influence from others."65 In particular the Code
suggests that physicians should be cautious "when a close relative of the
patient becomes too overtly involved in the conversation between the
physician and the patient, or repeatedly gives answers that the physician
wishes to hear from the patient."66 The existence of such behaviour may
indicate that the person may not be exercising their free will to request
euthanasia, thus not satisfying the requirement hat the request be externally
voluntary. In such cases, it is suggested that physicians should consult
with the patient privately and explore the issue of external voluntariness
directly with the patient.
67
The pivotal issue here is that a request for euthanasia must come
from a patient-it cannot be made by a third party.68 If there is any doubt
concerning external pressure then this should put the physician on notice
that the request may not be made voluntarily. If after consultation there is
any residual doubt, then on the face of the law, they should not grant the
request. However, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, there is some
acceptance of the principle that some external pressure may be lawfully
applied and this will not necessarily vitiate external voluntariness. This is
an issue to address comprehensively and is a question of fact and degree,
taking into consideration the individual circumstances of the individual
patient.
64. Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Code of Practice (April 2015) at 11, online: <www.
euthanasiecommissie.nlde-toetsingscommissies/uitsprakenlbrochures/brochures/code-of-pmctice/1/
code-of-practice>. The Code of Practice of the Regional Euthanasia Review Committees was
published by the Committees after the second evaluation of the Termination of Life on Request and
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, 2002 (Nth) was completed. The second evaluation indicated
that information on how the Committees operate and how they interpret the statutory due care criteria
should be made more accessible. However, shortly after writing this article, the Committees released
the Euthanasie Code 2018, which replaces the Code of Practice 2015 discussed here, see Regionale
Toetsingscommissies Euthanasie, Euthanasie Code 2018 (2018), online: <www.euthanasiecommissie.
nl/uitspraken/brochures/brochures/euthanasiecode/2018/euthanasiecode20l8>. The Euthanasie Code
2018 is yet to be released in an English Translation, moreover, likely due to its recent release, there is
no discussion of the Euthanasie Code in the academic literature. Therefore, it is acknowledged that
the information provided here under the Code of Practice may have been updated, expanded upon or
superseded by the Euthanasie Code 2018. However, further discussion on this is not available.
65. Ibid.
66. Code of Practice (April 2015), ibid at 11.
67. Ibidat 23-24.
68. Ibid.
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It is therefore evident that safeguarding a voluntary decision under
the DWDA and the Review Procedures Act is critical and seemingly
elaborate safeguards have been mandated to ensure that voluntariness
is well protected. However, in both jurisdictions the legal response to
safeguarding voluntariness is vastly different. Under the DWDA, witnesses
play a significant role and are called upon to declare the non-existence
of behaviours that seek to undermine voluntariness-under the Review
Procedures Act no such requirement is made. However, in the Netherlands
it has been recognised that family members play a significant role for
physicians in assessing the due care criteria. Moreover, under the Review
Procedures Act, the Regional Review Committees play an integral role in
defining and shaping the parameters of the "voluntary" criterion and have
published some information on what "voluntary" means. However, in
comparison, there is little information publicly available on what "acting
voluntarily" means. The Oregon Health Authority maintain this silence,
thus precluding critical examination of this requirement. The review
procedure and the role of the Oregon Health Authority and the Regional
Euthanasia Review Committee in the Netherlands will now be considered.
II. Review Procedure of Granted Requests
After eligibility has been determined and assistance provided, the next
critical step mandated by the respective legislative instruments is that an
external review committee must review the request and determine whether
the physician complied with the legislative criteria. Thus, compliance with
the law is verified a posteriori n both jurisdictions. In Oregon the body
mandated with this task is the Oregon Health Authority (OHA), and in
the Netherlands this task is performed by one of five Regional Euthanasia
Review Committees (the Committees). It is important to highlight that in
Oregon and the Netherlands the review procedure commences after the
performance of different acts. In Oregon, the review procedure occurs
after the lethal prescription has been authorised, given that the physician's
involvement ceases once the prescription has been written.69 However, in
the Netherlands this process does not commence until after E/PAD has
been administered and the patient is deceased. Additionally, each review
committee only reviews cases where the request was granted-refused
requests are not examined. For clarity of discussion, the key differences in
the review procedure have been tabulated (Table 3).
69. ORS, 127.865 § 3.01(2), supra note 2; Oregon Administrative Rules, 333-009-0010.
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1. Oregon
Review Procedure
The Oregon Health Authority (OHA) are the authorised body to review
all reported cases of PAD under the DWDA. After a prescription has
been authorised, the prescribing physician must forward all documentation
to the OHA, which determines whether the legislative criteria have been
complied with." However, the OHA's power is not absolute, and cases
of non-compliance must be referred to the Oregon Medical Board, which
ultimately decides whether to sanction the physician. The DWDA itself is
silent on the composition of the OHA who provide the review procedure,
however it has been advised by the OHA that this task is performed by a
State Medical Officer who holds a medical degree, and a Research Analyst
who maintains all the patient files and records.72
To facilitate the review procedure, the OHA have issued administrative
rules-the Oregon Administrative Rules (OAR). The OARs stipulate that
the physician must forward all documentation to the OHA within 7 days of
authorising a prescription . 3 There are two review methods the physician
can choose 74 The first form requires the physician to submit to the OHA
the patient's written request for medication along with the "Attending
Physicians Compliance Form," the "Consulting Physicians Compliance
Form" and, if a referral was made, the "Psychiatric/Psychological
Physicians Compliance Form."75 All requisite forms have been drafted by
the OHA and can be accessed on their websitei6 The compliance forms
and the patient's request form have been drafted in such a way that they
require minimal substantive information to be added by the physician.
For example, both the attending and consulting physician's compliance
form predominantly require the physicians to check boxes confirming
that they have undertaken the substantive elements, with no requirement
70. Ibid, 127.865 § 3.11(1)(a).
71. The requisite documentation required under the DWDA and supplementary administrative rules
will be considered further below.
72. Email from Michaela E Okninski to the Oregon Health Authority, 18 August 2017.
73. Oregon Administrative Rules (OAR), 333-009-0010 (1),(a); see also ORS, 127.865 § 3.11(2)
(2015).
74. Oregon Administrative Rules, 333-009-0010 s 1.
75. Ibid, (b)(a)-(d).
76. See Oregon Health Authority, Death with Dignity Act: Death with Dignity Forms,
(November 2015), online: <www.oregoagov/oha!PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/
EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/pasforms.aspx>.
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to defend how they came to a determination." This is especially seen in
the requirement o ascertain voluntariness. Here, the physician is merely
required to check a box indicating they determined that the patient is "acting
voluntarily" without being required to justify how such a determination
was made.8 This is a stark point of contrast with the review procedure in
the Netherlands, where the physician must compile a detailed report for
the Committee, defending how they complied with each due care criteria.
This contrast will be drawn out in Part III.
The Second type of review permitted by the OARs is a short form
of review. The only difference with the review method here is that the
"Attending Physician's Compliance Form" is replaced by the "Attending
Physician's Compliance Short Form" (the Short Form).79 The Short Form
authorises the OHA to review the relevant sections of the patient's medical
record to determine compliance with the DWDA. The attending physician
must, therefore, forward the medical record to the DWDA to perform this
task. This second review method would arguably provide a more robust
form of review due to detailed information the OHA are required to
review in the patient's medical record. However, it has been advised by
the OHA that the preferred method of review is the former review method;
by submitting the "Attending Physician Compliance Form." In fact, very
few cases have been reviewed by using the Short Form method.8" The
information collected by the OHA forms part of the annual reports on PAD
which must be published.81
77. See ibid. The physician is not required to provide the OHA with a detailed report on how
voluntariness was determined. However, the DWDA requires specific detailed information to
be recorded on the patient's medical file see ORS, 127.855 § 3.09 (2015). This information is not
reviewed by the OHA.
78. The lack of detailed reporting to determine compliance with the law was subject to criticism
when the DWDA first came into force, however, the reporting procedure has not been amended dee
Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin, "The Oregon Report: Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (1999) May-June The
Hastings Centre Report 37.
79. OA, 333-009-0010 s (1)(b)(B).
80. Email From Michaela E Okninski to the Oregon Health Authority, 23 August 2017.
81. OAR, supra note 73 333-009-0020; for further discussion on the reporting system see
Oregon Health Authority, Methods (November 2015), online: <www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/
PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/
Pages/ar-index.aspx>. The OHA also require physicians to complete a follow up questionnaire after a
patient dies by ingesting the medication see 333-0090-0010 s 2.
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Oregon has now released 19 annual statistical reports." As explicitly
stated in the DWDA,83 the reports are purely statistical and do not provide
insight into how integral provisions of the DWDA have been interpreted
and applied. Additionally, the annual reports indicate that compliance with
the DWDA is high. Since the DWDA came into force, 22 referrals to the
Oregon Medical Board have been made.84 In all cases, no disciplinary
proceedings were brought against physicians for non-compliance.
However, while the evidence demonstrates near perfect compliance with
the DWDA, this does not necessarily mean that the law is functioning well
to safeguard voluntariness and weed out coercion and undue influence. In
Part 3, I will argue that the OHA's review procedure may be insufficient to
ensure voluntariness is protected.
82. This figure is correct at the time of writing this article (2017). For access to the annual statistical
reports see Oregon Health Authority, Death with Dignity Act Annual Reports (February 2017), online:
<www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/
DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>. The DWDA came into force in 1997, however
no prescriptions were authorised in this year.
83. ORS, 127.865 § 3.11(3).
84. See Oregon Health Division, Oregon ' Death With Dignity Act: Three years of legalized
physician-assisted suicide (22 February 2001) at 4, online: <www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/
PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/
Documents/year3.pdf>; Department of Human Services, Fourth Annual Report on Oregon s
Death with Dignity Act (6 February 2002) at 4, online: <www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/
PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/
Pages/ar-index.aspx>;DepartmentofHumanServices,SixthAnnualReportofOregon DeathwithDlignity
Act (10 March 2004) at 13, online: <www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/
EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>; Department
of Human Services, Seventh Annual Report on Oregon S Death with Dignity Act, (10 March
2005) at 14, online: <www.oregoagov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/
EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>; Department of
HumanServices,EighthAnnualReporton Oregon Death withDignityAct, (9March2006) at 13, online:
<www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/
DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>; Oregon Health Authority, Death with Dignity
Act 2006 (March 2007), online: <www.oregoagov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/
EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>; Oregon
Health Authority, 2008 Summary of Oregon S Death with Dignity Act (March 2008) at 2, online:
<www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/
DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>; Oregon Health Authority, 2009 Summary
of Oregons Death with Dignity Act (March 2010) at 2, online: <www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/
PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/
Pages/ar-index.aspx>; Oregon Health Authority, Oregons Death with Dignity Act 2010,
(January 2011) at 2, online: <www.oregoagov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/
EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>. See also email
from Michaela E Okninski to the Oregon Health Authority, 23 August 2017.
85. See Oregon Health Authority, 2008 Summary of Oregon s Death with Dignity Act,
(March 2009) at 2, online: <www.oregoagov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/
EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>; Oregon
Health Authority, 2009 Summary of Oregon Death with Dignity Act (March 2010) at 2, online:
<ww.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/
DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/ar-index.aspx>.
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2 The Netherlands
Review Procedure
Determination of whether a medical practitioner has properly "satisfied
[themselves] that the request is voluntary" is decided a posteriori-after
E/PAD has been performed. The Review Procedures Act mandates that
immediately following the death, the medical practitioner who performed
E/PAD must notify the municipal pathologist of the cause of death and
submit a report demonstrating compliance with the due care criteria.86 The
physician must also submit a copy of the independent physician's report
and any other documentation that will assist the Committee in making a
determination." The municipal pathologist does not assess the report but
then forwards the documentation to the relevant Committee established
under the Review Procedures Act."8
There are five committees established throughout the Netherlands
and each is comprised of physicians, lawyers and ethicists who review
all reported cases of E/PAD.89 This multi-disciplinary composition is
mandatory for each of the Committees, because each discipline reviews
reported cases through their own professional ens and each brings essential
insight into determining compliance with the different elements of the due
care criteria. In performing the review procedure, the Committees divide
cases into two categories of notifications; 1) straightforward notifications;
and 2) notifications that raise questions.9" The majority of notifications are
categorised as straightforward (75%) and are reviewed by all committee
members digitally.91 However, if any issues arise during the digital review
process then the case is referred to the monthly committee meetings, where
the more complex cases are discussed in detail.
92
86. Law of 7 March 1991 (Wet op de lijkbezorging). AnEnglishtranslation of the relevant provisions
of the Burial and Cremation Act can be found in the annual reports released by the Committees, see
Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2015 (2016) at 46, online: <https://english.
euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/publications/annual-reports/2002/annual-reports/
annual-reports>.
87. Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, supra note 50 at 8.
88. Ibid. For an overview of the review procedure see Regional Euthanasia Review Committee,
Review Procedure in Text, online: <englislLeuthanasiecommissie.nl/review-procedure/review-
procedure-in-text>.
89. Termination ofLife on Request andAssisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, 2002 (Nth) s 3(2).
90. Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, supra note 50 at 8.
91. Categorizing cases as straightforward and non-straightforward is a relatively new procedure that
commenced in 2012. In 2016, 80 per cent of the notifications were considered to be straightforward, see
Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2016 (March 2017) at 19, online: <english.
euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/publications/annual-reports/2002/annual-reports/
annual-reports>.
92. Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, supra note 50 at 8.
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The Committees are vested with quasi-judicial power. They have the
power to determine compliance with the due care criteria and to develop
the law, thus playing a significant role in interpreting external pressure.93
The fact that the Committees are vested with such broad discretionary
power has not been accepted uncritically though. Boer argues the recent
dramatic yearly increases in reported cases of euthanasia can be attributed
to the liberties bestowed upon the Committees to interpret the due care
criteria. He argues that this has resulted in a marked shift in the pathology of
euthanasia practice in the Netherlands.94 However, despite this ostensible
liberty, the scope of the Committees' power is limited in cases of non-
compliance and they cannot impose a penalty or commence disciplinary
proceedings. This is consistent with the scope of the OHA's power discussed
in the preceding section. The decision to commence disciplinary action or
prosecute the physician vests in the regional health care inspector and the
Board of Procurators General.95 However, prior to making any referral, the
Committee will afford the physician the opportunity to adduce additional
information to justify their action. It is important to note that prosecutions
for non-compliance with the due care criteria are extremely rare .96 The
annual empirical data published by the Committees demonstrate that to
date there have been no prosecutions for cases referred by the Committees
to the Board of Procurators General.9
Thus, while the review procedure to determine compliance with
the legislative criteria is verified a posteriori in both Oregon and the
93. Decisions of the Committee and how external pressure has been defined was considered in detail
in Part I of this article.
94. Theo Boer, "Dialectics of Lead; 50 Years of Dutch Euthanasia and its Lessons" (2018) 75:2 Intl
J Envtl Stud at 239, 242-246.
95. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, 2002 (Nth) s
8(1). Decisions whether to prosecute physicians who violate the due-care criteria are based upon
the 'Instructions on prosecution decisions in the matter of termination of life on request and assisted
suicide' (Aanwijxing vervolginsbeslissing levensbeeindiging op verzoek (euthanasie en hulp bij
zelfdoding)).
96. See Miller & Kim, supra note 8. Miller and Kim conducted comprehensive r search on cases
where the due care criteria were not met and concluded that between 2002-2016, 89 out of 49, 287
reported cases for E/PAD were found not to meet the due care criteria.
97. See Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2016 (March 2017) at 7, online:
<english.euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-co mmittees/documents/pub lications/annual-reports/20 02/
annual-reports/annual-reports>. However, after writing this article, it was announced that four cases
performed in 2017 have been referred to the Board of Procurators General for investigation. The
outcome of these cases is not yet known. In two of these cases, the complaint concerns failure to
properly determine that the request was voluntary. Thus, this could potentially provide further insight
into the operation of the due care criterion to ascertain that he request was voluntary, see Daniel
Boffey, "Dutch Prosecutors to Investigate Euthanasia Cases After Sharp Rise," The Guardian (12
March 2018), online: <www.theguardiancom/world/2018/mar/12/dutch-prosecutors-investigate-
euthanasia-cases-sharp-rise-docter-assisted-deaths-netherlands>.
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Netherlands, there are critical differences in how the review procedure
is performed. In Oregon this happens after the physician authorises the
lethal prescription, and in the Netherlands this occurs after E/PAD has
been administered and life has been terminated. Additionally in Oregon
the review procedure is largely performed by the physician checking boxes
indicating compliance with the legislative criteria and they are not required
to defend how they determined the person was acting voluntarily. This is a
stark point of contrast with the requirement under the Review Procedures
Act where the physician must submit a detailed report defending how
they determined the request was voluntary. Moreover, in the Netherlands
the composition of the review committee is multi-disciplinary and each
discipline views each reported case through its own professional lens.
Whereas in Oregon, a medically qualified State Medical Officer primarily
performs this duty. The key differences with the legislative safeguards and
review procedure will now be considered and strengths and limitations
will now be discussed.
III. Comparative Analysis to the Two Jurisdictions
In both Oregon and the Netherlands it is fundamental that physicians must
ensure that requests for PAD or E/PAD are voluntary and not the product
of external pressure. However, there are critical differences between
the two jurisdictions concerning how voluntariness is safeguarded and
how the review procedure is performed. Key differences will now be
considered, and strengths and limitations will be drawn out. The aim here
is to provide a comparative analysis to highlight identified strengths and
limitations with some of the legislative criteria, which will hopefully prove
useful for jurisdictions still considering legalizing some form of assisted
dying. The first part of this critical comparative analysis will focus on the
provisions that aim to safeguard voluntariness under each statute, drawing
on the discussion in Part I. This will then be followed by a comparative
analysis of the review procedure in Oregon and the Netherlands, which
was considered in detail in Part II of this article.
1. The Legislative Safeguards
Both jurisdictions have seemingly strict safeguards in place to protect
a voluntary decision. However, there are fundamental differences in
the approach taken to safeguard a voluntary decision. The most notable
difference was the inclusion of witnesses in requests for PAD in Oregon.
The witness provisions will be discussed first. The second associated issue
that will be considered is the omission to define the key terms under the
statute. These requirements have been described in detail in Part I, they
will, therefore, not be repeated here.
146 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Witness Provisions
The inclusion ofwitnessesto safeguard avoluntary decision is a fundamental
element of a valid request for PAD in Oregon. In the Netherlands, there is
no requirement for witnesses to sign a request for euthanasia, as assessing
voluntariness is primarily the responsibility of the attending physician.
It may, at first, seem prudent to call upon additional persons to attest to
the voluntariness of the request. Indeed, they may have more in depth
personal knowledge of the individual and their social environment,
therefore placing them in a better position than the physician to determine
unacceptable social influences. However, there are limitations with this
approach which arguably weaken the ideology behind this safeguard.
First, the witness is not required to be personally known to the person
making the request. There are exclusionary criteria that preclude people
as witnesses, namely those who seek to gain financially from a premature
death.9" Yet there are no minimum mandatory requirements for persons to
act as witnesses, such as the minimum length of the relationship. Assessing
for voluntariness and the absence of duress, coercion and undue influence
in a request for PAD presupposes ome kind of personal relationship with
the person, yet this is not currently mandatory. For such a safeguard to
operate properly, at least one witness should be personally known to the
person to enable them to make a proper assessment of voluntariness.
Under the DWDA, the witness provisions appear to be a formality rather
than a safeguard, that offers limited protection for a voluntary decision.
This issue is exacerbated by the failure to define the key terms under
the legislation. Witnesses are required to attest to the non-existence of
certain complex behaviours under the DWDA-duress, coercion and
undue influence.99 This seemingly strict approach reflects the position that
external pressures are nuanced and operate at varying degrees, ranging
from subtle unacceptable persuasions (undue influence), through to the
extreme (coercion/duress). Thus, under the DWDA, it appears that more
is required than examination of "external pressure." However, none of
these key terms are defined in the DWDA and there is no guidance or
framework available for witnesses that would assist them to discharge this
requirement in a meaningful way.
98. See Part I for discussion on the witness requirements. The appropriateness of undue influence
as a safeguard for a voluntary decision has been considered in the past elsewhere, see Thaddeus Pope
& Michaela Okninski, "Legal Standards for Brain Death and Undue Influence in Euthanasia Laws"
(2016) 13:2 J Bio Inq at 173-78; Michaela Okninski, "Commentary on Undue Influence Provisions
under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and California's End of Life Option Act" (2017) 25:1 J Law
& Medicine 77.
99. See Table 2.
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Thus, it is likely that persons called upon to be witnesses, unless
perhaps legally trained (and expert in equity), would know the difference
between these behaviours. Furthermore, the inclusion of undue influence,
which is a subtle form of unacceptable external pressure, is not a term
that exists in the ordinary English lexicon, but rather, is a complex legal
doctrine.10 0 The inclusion of a complex legal doctrine coupled with the
failure to define key terms means that it is unlikely that this approach will
provide meaningful protection.
In contrast, the Netherlands do not require witnesses to safeguard
voluntariness or sign a request for E/PAD. This is solely the responsibility
of the attending physician. However, it is unlikely that Oregon's witness
requirements offer any advantages over the protections that exist in the
Netherland's Review Procedures Act.
Defining Key Terms
The associated issue that arises with the voluntariness safeguards is the
failure to define key terms.10 1
In Oregon two physicians must agree that the person was "acting
voluntarily." However, "acting voluntarily" is not defined. Moreover,
the OHA does not provide any guidance on how acting voluntarily
should be determined and what should be considered when determining
voluntariness. 102 In fact, there is an overall lack of clarity concerning this
criterion and how it should be examined.103 Acting voluntarily is critical to
the operation of the DWDA, yet it remains overlooked, arguably weakening
the effect of this safeguard. Given the gravity of what the DWDA legalizes
and the finality of PAD, detailed guidance and discussion on this criterion
100. Undue influence recognizes that subtle forms of influence and pressure, in the right
circumstances, can become unlawful and vitiate voluntariness, thus negating a voluntary decision
see for example Slusarenko v Slusarenko, 147 P 3d 920; Reddaway v Reddaway, 329 P 2d 886; see
also Sarah Worthington, Equity (Oxford University Press, 2003) 192-199. If a decision was made
pursuant to the undue influence of another it is said to not be made freely and the law will not permit
the decision to stand see, for example, Barclays Bank plc v O'Brien, [1994] 1 AC 180; Royal Bank
of Scotland v Etridge, [2001] 4 All ER 449. For judicial consideration of undue influence in refusal
of medical treatment in England see (Re T (Adult: refusal of medical treatment), [1993] C.A. Fam
95. Furthermore, in recent years California completed a research project to devise a screening tool
for undue influence for use in Adult Protective Services (APS), whose primary responsibility is to
work with adults at risk of elder abuse. Thus, it can be said that it is being recognised that undue
influence is a concern and educating people who role it is to work with vulnerable people is of critical
importance, see Mary Joy Quinn et al, "Developing an Undue Influence Screening Tool for Adult
Protective Services" (2017) 29 J Elder Abuse & Neglect 157.
101. Refer to Part I, especially Table 2, for an overview of the legislative safeguards.
102. The role of the OHA will be considered further below.
103. The role of the OHA and the limited data they collect is not a new criticism, see Kathleen Foley
& Herbert Hendin, "The Oregon Report: Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (1999) 29:3 Hastings Centre Report
at 37-42.
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should be made available if it is to operate effectively as a safeguard. This
is a stark point of contrast with the position in the Netherlands, where
the Committee strive to provide transparency and guidance into how to
properly assess voluntariness.
The Review Procedures Act itself is evasive and does not define what
a voluntary request is. While this lack of definition and overall guidance
can be perceived as a limitation, this is not the case. The Committees
play an integral role in defining the parameters of voluntariness and have
published a considerable amount of literature to clarify what voluntary
means."4 Judgments of reported cases are routinely published on the
Committees' website and any cases that raise novel or complex issues are
usually made publicly available. It is the mandate of the Committees to
ensure that the law is transparent, and that guidance is provided as to how
external voluntariness should be assessed."0 5 In comparison this appears to
be a marked improvement on the position under the DWDA, where there
is a sustained lack of transparency. Under the DWDA, physicians should
be made to rigorously defend their position on how they determined a
decision was voluntary and not be required to tick a box indicating that
they complied with this criterion.0 6 Moreover, the OHA should play
a more active role and require detailed information to be submitted
concerning how compliance with the law was determined then important
information based upon previous decisions of the OHA concerning this
criterion should be published. Providing insight and transparency into this
requirement could strengthen the legislative safeguards.
2. Review Procedure
Reviewing reported cases of PAD and E/PAD to determine whether the
legislative criteria have been complied with is an important aspect of
regulation. The review procedure in both Oregon and the Netherlands is
retrospective and occurs after assistance has been provided. The Oregon
Health Authority and the Regional Euthanasia Review Committee are
vested with this duty. They can determine compliance with the law, however
they do not have the authority to sanction physicians for non-compliance
104. See Part I for discussion onthis. It was also considered in Part I that the request must be externally
voluntary and not the result of unacceptable pressure.
105. See Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, supra note 59.
106. Issues with the review procedure and the box ticking requirement will be considered in detail
below.
Voluntariness Safeguards and Review Procedure under 149
Oregon and the Netherlands' Physician Assisted Dying Laws
and these cases are referred to another authority for determination."'~
Assessment of whether the physician properly considered that the request
was voluntary and not the result of external pressure is determined at this
stage as well. Key differences with the review procedure will now be
critiqued. The review procedure process was described in detail in Part II
and will, therefore, not be discussed here.
Review Procedure Process
Reviewing reported cases of PAD and E/PAD for compliance with the law is
a critical aspect of regulation. Legalising or decriminalising assisted dying
is a highly controversial step to take. The review procedure process can
reassure the general public that the law is subject to strict scrutiny and that
the legislative safeguards are working well. Furthermore, this may assist
to dispel the perennial fear that assisted dying legislation will ultimately
be abused or misused. However, to ensure that public confidence in the
law is maintained, the review procedure process must be both robust and
rigorous. The procedure adopted by the OHA raises concerns regarding
the quality of the review.
In Part II it was demonstrated that under the OARs there are two forms
of review procedure the physician can elect to use. The most common
type of review is undertaken by the physician submitting to the OHA a
series of compliance forms."8 Part C of both the "Attending Physician's
Compliance Form" and the "Consulting Physician's Compliance Form"
contain a list of the substantive legislative criteria that the physicians
must adhere to in order to lawfully provide PAD."0 9 Instead of requiring
107. See Part I. In Oregon this authority is the Oregon Medical Board and in the Netherlands cases
of non-compliance are referred to the regional health care inspector and the Board of Procurators
General for determination Referrals for non-compliance are rare in both jurisdictions. In Oregon
since the DWDA came into force 22 cases were referred for non-compliance with the DWDA. In
all cases, no physicians were penalised by the Oregon Medical Board see Oregon Health Division,
Death with Dignity Act Annual Reports (21 February 2017), online: <www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/
PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/
Pages/ar-index.aspx>. At the writing of this article there have been no charges laid against physicians
by the Board of Procurators General in the Netherlands for non-compliance with the due care criteria.
However, in 'a handful of cases' the regional healthcare inspector has commenced disciplinary
proceedings see Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, Annual Report 2016 (March 2017)
at 7, online: <english.euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/publications/annual-
reports/2002/annual-reports/annual-reports>.
108. The other type of review discussed in Part II was the short form version where the physician
authorised the OHA to review the person's medical record to determine compliance with the DWDA.
However, as this type of review has only been used a few times since the DWDA came into force, it
will not be considered in detail here.
109. Oregon Health Authority, Death With Dignity Forms (November 2015), online: <www.
oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/
DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Pages/pasforms.aspx>.
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both physicians to rigorously defend how they determined that the person
was acting voluntarily, the OHA merely requires the physician to check a
box indicating that they determined the person was acting voluntarily.
110
There is no formal requirement to submit a detailed report beyond the
compliance forms. Therefore, the OHA determines compliance with the
legislative criteria based upon whether the physician checked a box or not.
It remains to be seen how this method can in fact determine compliance
with the legislative criteria. The OHAs perform a minimalist function in
reviewing reported cases and provides no independent scrutiny of the
physicians' judgment. Furthermore, the apparent lack of critical review
of reported cases of PAD undermines the statistical data released by the
OHA.m The OHA have consistently argued that there is no evidence to
indicate that persons are being coerced or under duress or undue influence
to make a request, suggesting that the legislative safeguards are working
well at protecting a voluntary decision. However, the foundation of this
data is built on precarious ground, as there is no robust or rigorous review
of reported cases performed by the OHA. Thus, it is apparent that there are
concerning shortfalls with the OHA review procedure. This serves as an
interesting contrast with the review procedure in the Netherlands, where
physicians are made to rigorously defend how they determined the person
making the request was doing so voluntarily and was not being externally
pressured to do so.
As well as mandating physicians to substantiate how they determined
the person was acting voluntarily, the Committee also review all reported
cases through a multi-disciplinary lens, thus ensuring that legal, medical
and ethical issues are properly considered in every case. Moreover,
selected judgments of the Committees are perennially published to ensure
transparency, clarity and consistency in the decisions of the Committee.
Moreover, complex cases or cases that raise novel issues are discussed in
detail to provide insight and guidance for physicians if they face analogous
cases in the future.
However, the role of the Committees in the Netherlands is not without
criticism. The very fact that they are vested with discretionary power to
interpret the law has led to the broadening of the interpretation of the
due care criteria and a dramatic increase in the annual rates of E/PAD." 2
Speaking of the marked uptake on E/PAD in the Netherlands since the law
110. See ibid. Similar criticisms of the OHA's review procedure have been raised in the past see Foley
and Hendin, supra note 103.
111. See Part II for discussion of the empirical data.
112. See Jocob Koopman & Theo Boer, "Turning Point in the Conception and Regulation of
Physician-Assisted Dying in the Netherlands" (2016) 129:8 Am J Med 773.
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was enforced in 2002, Boer argues that it may not be "legalization in itself
that leads to these developments, it may be the way in which the Dutch
have set he rules: the enormous liberties of the RRCs [the Committees], in
combination with the open character of the due care criteria."'113 However,
this criticism speaks more to the broadening of the interpretation of the
nature of the unbearable suffering, another important due care criterion,
rather than voluntariness, therefore, it is beyond the narrow scope of this
article. However, this remains a pertinent criticism of the review procedure
and could not go unsaid here. It can be concluded that the review procedure
adopted under both jurisdictions have limitations. However, in terms of
assessing voluntariness, the procedure adopted in the Review Procedures
Act appears to be more robust and rigorous than the OHA. Jurisdictions
contemplating legalisation of some form of assisted dying should take
heed of these concerns.
Conclusion
Legalization of some form of assisted dying remains a topical issue in
many jurisdictions throughout the world. In the ongoing assisted dying
debate, the experience of both Oregon and the Netherlands are highly
influential. Many jurisdictions, when drafting laws, draw inspiration from
their legislative frameworks and overwhelming experience. However,
there are significant differences in the approach to safeguarding a
voluntary decision and review procedure under the DWDA and the
Review Procedures Act. In comparing the two jurisdictions, it is apparent
that there are significant limitations with the DWDA concerning how it
safeguards voluntariness. Additionally, the review procedure in Oregon,
in comparison, appears to be fundamentally flawed. There is no critical
scrutiny of reported cases of PAD, and compliance with the DWDA is
determined by whether a physician checked a box. Death is irreversible
and given this finality, it is essential that the legislative safeguards provide
meaningful protection in safeguarding voluntariness and that the review
procedure is both robust and rigorous. In conclusion, the position adopted
in the Netherlands appears to be superior and is perhaps more desirable as
a model in this limited capacity.
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